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ABSTRACT 
  In recent years, dozens of states have enacted anti-Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) laws to counter 
SLAPP suits, or lawsuits filed to silence a defendant who has spoken 
out against a plaintiff. The goal of a SLAPP suit is not to win on the 
merits, but rather to discourage the defendant’s right to free speech 
through the prospect of ruinously expensive litigation. State anti-
SLAPP laws provide for special motions to dismiss, which allow a 
defendant to file an expedited motion to dispose of the SLAPP suit 
before engaging in costly discovery. 
  It is well established that a federal court sitting in diversity applies 
state substantive law and federal procedural rules. Following the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., however, it is unclear whether the 
state-level anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss should apply in 
federal courts. This Note discusses Shady Grove and examines how 
two lower courts have struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the 
context of state anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss. This Note 
then proposes a more nuanced, two-pronged interpretation for 
determining the applicability of state laws in federal courts. Applying 
this interpretation, this Note argues that state anti-SLAPP special 
motions to dismiss should apply in federal courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 12, 2008, elementary-school principal Pat Godin filed 
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 against the School Department 
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Board of Directors and School Union of Fort O’Brien School in 
Machiasport, Maine.2 Godin also included state claims of defamation 
and contract interference against several individual defendants.3 The 
complaint alleged that Godin was terminated early from her 
employment contract after the school board received unsupported 
complaints about her inappropriate conduct toward students.4 In 
response to Godin’s § 1983 action and allegations, the individual 
defendants moved to dismiss Godin’s claims5 under the special 
motion procedures of Maine’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (anti-SLAPP) law.6 The Maine law, like anti-SLAPP 
laws in twenty-eight other states,7 was enacted to provide expedited 
review of lawsuits filed to chill defendants’ exercise of their First 
Amendment rights.8 
More than three years later on August 24, 2011, multinational 
corporation 3M filed a defamation lawsuit against Lanny Davis, a 
prominent Washington attorney and former advisor to President 
Clinton, and other corporate defendants.9 The amended complaint 
alleged that Davis engaged in a smear campaign and “defamatory 
media blitz”10 against 3M.11 Davis and the other defendants allegedly 
published press releases claiming 3M acted dishonestly, created a 
website that republished these false statements, and coordinated 
“fake public demonstrations.”12 Like the individual defendants in 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 2. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 3. Id. at 81. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 81–82. 
 6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012). 
 7. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-
slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (listing the states that 
have and have not enacted anti-SLAPP laws). 
 8. Plaintiffs file SLAPP suits to intimidate and silence a defendant who has spoken out 
against or criticized the plaintiff. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. The purpose of filing 
a SLAPP suit is not to win on the merits, but rather to burden the defendant with costly and 
time-consuming litigation. See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. In response to SLAPP 
suits, many states have passed anti-SLAPP laws with special motions to dismiss (special 
motions) that allow defendants to dispose of meritless lawsuits before engaging in costly 
discovery. See supra note 7. For a more extensive discussion of anti-SLAPP laws, see infra Part 
I.B. 
 9. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 10. Id. at 90 (quotation marks omitted). 
 11. Id. at 90–91. 
 12. Id. at 90 (quotation marks omitted). 
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Godin v. Schencks,13 Davis and the other defendants also moved to 
dismiss under the special motion procedure of the District of 
Columbia’s anti-SLAPP law.14 
These two cases hinged on the same issue: Should a federal court 
sitting in diversity apply state law or federal law?15 More specifically, 
can a federal court invoke the state-level anti-SLAPP special motion 
to dismiss (special motion), or is the special motion trumped by a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6)16 motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim? The special motions in Maine and the 
District of Columbia are strikingly similar in that both grant 
expedited review of the legal validity of a plaintiff’s claim.17 But the 
cases came out differently. In Godin, the First Circuit held that the 
special motion did apply in federal court: the special motion did not 
conflict with Rule 12, and applying the special motion advanced 
litigant equality.18 In 3M Co. v. Boulter,19 the District Court for the 
District of Columbia held that the special motion did not apply in 
federal court: the special motion conflicted with Rule 12, and Rule 12 
was a valid exercise under the Rules Enabling Act (REA),20 as it did 
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive state rights.21 The 
defendants in Godin could invoke state law to quickly dismiss 
Godin’s claims; the defendants in Boulter could not invoke state law.22 
These two cases are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. 
 
 13. Godin v. Schenks, 629 F.3d 79, 81–82 (1st Cir. 2010).  
 14. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 92. The current version of the statute under which 
defendants filed their motion is D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2001 & Supp. 2013). 
 15. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 86 (“The issue is whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) and 56 preclude application of Section 556 in federal court.”); Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 
at 92 (“3M has filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ special motions to dismiss, claiming that the 
Act is ultra vires and, in any event, does not apply in a federal court sitting in diversity.”). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Throughout this Note, “Rule 12” is used to refer generally to 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(d). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to the pleadings, 
id., whereas a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(d) includes affidavits and limited discovery 
outside the pleadings, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). For further discussion of Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(d), 
see infra note 158. 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 81–82, 92 (reversing the District Court of Maine and holding 
that “the Maine anti-SLAPP statute must be applied”). 
 19. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 21. See Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d. at 110–11 (“[T]he special motion to dismiss procedure 
under the [District of Columbia] [a]nti-SLAPP Act does not apply . . . .”). 
 22. This Note loosely refers to the District of Columbia as a “state” and refers to the 
District of Columbia anti-SLAPP law as a “state law” with the recognition that the District of 
Columbia is not technically a state. 
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For over a century, courts have grappled with which law, state or 
federal, to apply in federal court.23 It is well established that when a 
state law and federal rule conflict, a federal court sitting in diversity 
applies state substantive law and federal procedural rules.24 When a 
state law and federal rule do not conflict, a federal court applies the 
state law so long as the state law advances litigant equality and there 
is no countervailing federal interest.25 What is less certain is how to 
determine a conflict, and how to distinguish between substantive law 
and procedural rules. Despite numerous cases on these questions,26 
the Supreme Court has not come to a consensus. The Court has 
sometimes found conflict between a state law and federal rule and, 
stressing federal uniformity, has applied the federal rule.27 Other 
times, the Court has not found conflict and, emphasizing state 
deference, has applied the state law.28 As one commentator has 
 
 23. The first Supreme Court case on this question dates back to 1842. Swift v. Tyson, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 24. In broad strokes, when a state law and federal rule conflict, the federal law applies if it 
is a valid exercise under the REA. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965) (“We 
conclude that the adoption of Rule 4(d)(1) . . . neither exceeded the congressional mandate 
embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule 
is therefore the standard against which the District Court should have measured the adequacy 
of the service.”). This means that the federal rule cannot “‘abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.’” Id. at 464 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (“If Congress intended to reach the issue before the district 
court, and if it enacted its intention into law in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that 
is the end of the matter.”). If the federal rule does abridge substantive rights, the state law 
applies. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (“In giving federal courts 
‘cognizance’ of equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the 
federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to create 
substantive rights denied by State law.”). 
 25. Though this proposition may appear straightforward, there is much confusion about 
how to balance litigant equality and countervailing federal interests. Whereas the Supreme 
Court in Hanna v. Plumer focused on litigant equality, see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–69, the Court 
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), stressed 
countervailing federal interests, id. at 537–38. 
 26. E.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Hanna, 380 U.S. 460; Byrd, 356 U.S. 525; Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 
99; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 27. See, e.g., Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6–9, 16 (holding that an order for physical examination 
under Rule 35 conflicted with an Illinois law forbidding such physical examination and that Rule 
35 applied in federal court because “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and 
procedure of federal courts”). 
 28. See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419, 431 (holding that the federal standard for an 
excessive jury verdict did not conflict with the New York standard for excessiveness and that the 
New York standard applied in federal court because “Erie precludes a recovery in federal court 
significantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court”). 
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observed, figuring out which law applies is a confusing and 
“analytical[ly] fog[gy]” inquiry.29 
At the same time, determining which law applies is of great 
importance to both federalism and individual rights. When a state 
passes a law intended to protect its citizens, how can that law apply in 
state court but not in federal court? How could the defendants in 
Boulter invoke the special motion to quickly dismiss 3M’s claims in 
state court but not in federal court? Even more puzzling, how can 
courts reconcile the application of one state law in federal court, but 
not a nearly identical state law in another federal court? How could 
the defendants in Godin invoke the special motion in federal court, 
but not the defendants in Boulter? 
Rather than clarify these questions, the most recent Court case 
on this issue has only added to the confusion. In Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,30 the Justices 
built upon existing precedent and set forth three different opinions—
Justice Scalia’s plurality, Justice Stevens’s concurrence, and Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent—for determining which law applies in federal 
court.31 Unsure about the divergent frameworks in the three opinions, 
lower courts—like the First Circuit in Godin and the District Court 
for the District of Columbia in Boulter—have invoked different 
approaches and come to different conclusions.32 In an effort to shed 
light on and eradicate this confusion, this Note draws from the three 
opinions in Shady Grove and proposes a more nuanced, two-pronged 
interpretation for determining the applicability of state laws in federal 
courts sitting in diversity. This Note then applies this interpretation to 
state anti-SLAPP special motions and concludes that such special 
motions should apply in federal court. 
Although many scholars have commented on the applicability of 
state laws in federal courts33 and recognized that the three opinions in 
 
 29. Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the Confusion—but 
Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1208 (2011). 
 30. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 31. See infra Part II. As discussed within, Justice Scalia’s opinion commanded a majority in 
some parts and a plurality in others. See infra note 108. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See generally, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 
(1974); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008). 
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Shady Grove are confusing,34 only a handful have proposed a more 
workable approach.35 The few scholars who have pressed further have 
not applied their respective interpretations to an existing conflict 
between a federal rule and state law. More specifically, no scholar has 
considered state anti-SLAPP special motions and their applicability in 
federal courts after Shady Grove.36 
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly explains SLAPP 
suits and state anti-SLAPP laws. Part II discusses Shady Grove and 
the Justices’ three different approaches for determining which law 
applies in federal court. Part III examines how two lower courts, the 
First Circuit and District Court for the District of Columbia, have 
struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the context of state anti-
SLAPP special motions. 
Shifting from the descriptive to the normative, Part IV draws 
from the Justices’ three opinions in Shady Grove and proposes a 
more nuanced, two-pronged interpretation for determining the 
applicability of state laws in federal courts. When faced with a 
competing federal rule and state law, courts should first broadly 
construe the issue before the court and compare, side by side, the text 
of the federal rule and state law. If the federal rule leaves no 
operation for the state law, as is often the case, the court should find 
that the federal rule and state law conflict. Second, in considering 
whether the federal rule is valid under the REA, the court should 
give teeth to the substantive-rights proviso of the REA37 and fully 
consider the state’s purpose in enacting the law.38 The state interest 
 
 34. See Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1208 (“At the end of the day, Shady Grove generates 
much heat but sheds little light . . . .”). 
 35. See generally Stephen R. Brown, For Lack of a Better Rule: Using the Concept of 
Transsubtantivity To Solve the Erie Problem in Shady Grove, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2011); 
Doernberg, supra note 29; Jeffrey Redfern, Federal “Procedural” Rules Undermine Important 
State Interests in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431 (2010), 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393 (2011); see also infra note 38. 
 36. There is one published article on state anti-SLAPP laws and their general applicability 
in federal court; however, this article is from 2008 and is pre–Shady Grove. See Lisa Litwiller, A 
SLAPP in the Face: Why Principles of Federalism Suggest that Federal District Courts Should 
Stop Turning the Other Cheek, 1 J. CT. INNOVOVATION 67 (2008). 
 37. The substantive-rights proviso of the REA refers to the text of the REA stipulating 
that the federal rule “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b) (2006). 
 38. Among others, Professors Joseph P. Bauer and Jeffrey Redfern have argued that Shady 
Grove overstated the federal interest and failed to give sufficient weight to the state interest. See 
Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from 
a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 960 (2011) (arguing that the majority in 
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should weigh heavily, especially when the state has a compelling 
rationale for protecting its citizenry; however, the state interest 
should also balance with the desire for a uniform system of federal 
procedure. 
Embedded in Part IV is an application of this new interpretation 
to state anti-SLAPP special motions. Courts should deem that Rule 
12 conflicts with the special motions, and, in balancing state and 
federal interests, Rule 12 impermissibly violates substantive state 
rights. State anti-SLAPP special motions should thus apply in federal 
courts sitting in diversity. 
I.  SLAPP SUITS AND ANTI-SLAPP LAWS 
To understand how state anti-SLAPP special motions interact 
with Rule 12, it is imperative to first understand what a SLAPP suit is, 
and why and how state legislatures have worked to counteract them. 
This Part briefly discusses the history of SLAPP suits and the core 
provision of state anti-SLAPP laws: the special motion. This Part also 
details the Maine and District of Columbia anti-SLAPP laws, the 
state laws at issue in Godin and Boulter.  
A. SLAPP Suits 
SLAPP suits, or Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 
are not like traditional lawsuits, in which the goal is to obtain a legal 
or equitable remedy. First defined in 1988 by Professors Penelope 
Canan and George Pring,39 SLAPP suits are filed with the intention of 
 
Shady Grove went astray by “failing properly to identify and consider [the] state interests, as 
well as by overstating the federal interests at stake”); Redfern, supra note 35, at 402–03 (“A 
Federal Rule should not be applied in a case where it interferes with a state’s legitimate ability 
to regulate the conduct of its own citizens.”). 
 39. Professors Canan and Pring studied SLAPP suits throughout the 1980s and in 1988 
published an article that “empirically test[ed] for the first time the prevailing political and 
judicial assumptions that SLAPPs ‘chill,’ or deter, citizen participation.” Penelope Canan & 
George W. Pring, Research Note, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: 
Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC. REV. 385, 386 (1988). In this 
article, Canan and Pring define SLAPP suits as: (1) “a civil claim for monetary damages,” (2) 
“filed against nongovernmental individuals and institutions,” (3) “based on advocacy before a 
government branch official or the electorate, and,” (4) “on a substantive issue of some public or 
societal significance.” Id. at 387 (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted). Several scholars have 
questioned this definition of SLAPP suits. See Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuits 
Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W.L. REV. 399, 401 (1993) 
(contending that Professors Canan and Pring’s definition is too restrictive); Thomas A. 
Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weakness in First Amendment Law and in the Courts’ 
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intimidating the defendant with costly and time-consuming 
litigation.40 The intention is not to win, but rather to discourage the 
defendant through the prospect of ruinously expensive litigation.41 As 
one commentator has noted, “[I]t is through the legal process itself—
dragging the unwitting target through the churning waters of 
litigation—that the SLAPP filer prevails.”42 
Given this objective, the typical SLAPP suit occurs after a 
defendant has spoken out against or criticized a plaintiff.43 Shifting 
from the political arena to the judicial forum,44 the angered plaintiff 
then files a lawsuit against the defendant.45 For example, a developer 
might sue a local resident who has voted against the developer’s 
zoning-board approval, or a candidate running for office might sue a 
vehement opponent. Or, as in Boulter, a large multinational company 
might sue to silence the dissenting media.46 In the prototypical SLAPP 
suit, a plaintiff usually seeks a large—oftentimes untenable—amount 
of damages.47 In a 1989 study of 228 SLAPP suits, the average 
damages award sought was a whopping $9 million.48 Beyond damages, 
the hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that the plaintiff’s claim almost 
 
Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REV. 979 (1992) (arguing that Professors Canan 
and Pring’s definition is too expansive).  
 40. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” 
(“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 942 
(1992). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the Impact of Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, Blogs and Consumer Gripe Sites, 21 
DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 221, 231 (2011). 
 43. Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in 
California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 969–70 (1999). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Pring & Canan, supra note 40, at 946–47 (listing the four elements of a SLAPP suit 
as: (1) a civil complaint or counterclaim; (2) filed against nongovernmental individuals and/or 
groups; (3) because of their communication to a government body, official, or the electorate; (4) 
on an issue of some public interest or concern). 
 46. See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2012) (reciting 3M’s claim that 
the defendants schemed “to extract $30 million from 3M” in part by bombarding 3M with 
“sensational and false accusations . . . in the global media” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 47. See Cosentino, supra note 39, at 404 (“After the SLAPP is filed, citizens risk becoming 
personally accountable to the plaintiff for massive damages.”); James E. Grossberg & Dee 
Lord, California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, COMM. LAW, Fall 1995, at 3, 4 (“SLAPP plaintiffs 
usually seek astronomical damages as part of their strategy of intimidation.”). 
 48. Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
23, 25–26 (1989). Adjusted for inflation, this $9 million figure from 1989 is approximately $16.9 
million in 2013 dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
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always lacks merit49—the plaintiff is merely seeking to silence and 
harass the defendant for speaking out.50 
Though the earliest SLAPP suit dates back to 1802,51 the advent 
of the Internet as a new means for speaking out publicly has greatly 
increased the number of SLAPP suits.52 There is a “growing trend of 
businesses and professionals suing consumers who gripe[] about them 
online.”53 For example, a towing company filed a SLAPP suit against 
a college student after the student made disparaging remarks about 
the company on Facebook.54 
Concurrent with the recent explosion in voicing one’s opinions 
on the Internet, SLAPP suits have become highly criticized and 
disfavored. First, SLAPP suits are criticized for the significant power 
differential between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff is 
typically more wealthy and can afford years of litigation,55 whereas 
the defendant is often an ordinary “middle-class[,] . . . middle-of-the-
road American[].”56 As such, a SLAPP suit can deplete a defendant’s 
resources. Second, SLAPP suits are criticized for threatening the core 
 
 49. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970 
(9th Cir. 1999) (“The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit . . . .”); Penelope Canan & 
George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 SOC. PROBS. 506, 514 
(1988) (remarking that SLAPP defendants win early dismissals in 68 percent of cases and win 
judgments in 83 percent of cases). 
 50. See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1989) (“The apparent goal of SLAPPs is to stop citizens from exercising 
their political rights or to punish them for having done so.”). 
 51. In Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt. 1802), Attorney Ebenezer Harris accused five 
citizens of “devising, writing, and publishing . . . libel” to prevent his re-election for justice of the 
peace and sought $5,000 in damages. Id. at 129–32. The Supreme Court of Vermont dismissed 
his complaint. Id. at 147. 
 52. See Zoe Tillman, Getting SLAPPed: New D.C. Law Designed To Stop Suits That Use 
Financial Bullying, NAT’L L. J., May 16, 2011, at 13, 16 (“‘Companies and political figures who 
weren’t used to being criticized have confronted the brave new world of the Internet by trying 
to shut people up.’” (quoting Paul Alan Levy, attorney with the Public Citizen Litigation 
Group)). 
 53. Richards, supra note 42, at 224. 
 54. Rex Hall, Jr., Firm Sues WMU Student over Facebook Page: Towing Company Seeks 
$750,000 in Damages for Online Criticism, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 14, 2010, at A6. 
 55. See Peter Blumberg, Intent To Chill: Four Cases Before California’s High Court Raise 
the Issue of Intent on the Part of Plaintiffs Who File SLAPP Suits, S.F. DAILY JOURNAL, June 5, 
2002 (“Your quintessential SLAPP suit is by a wealthy person or organization trying to defeat 
the other side . . . .”). 
 56. Pring & Canan, supra note 40, at 940. 
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rights to free expression and free access to government.57 One New 
York trial judge has suggested that “[s]hort of a gun to the head, a 
greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be 
imagined.”58 Third, SLAPP suits are criticized for the onus they place 
on the judicial system. The thousands of SLAPP suits filed each year 
“waste judicial resources and clog the already overburdened court 
dockets.”59 
Traditional defenses and procedural remedies are ineffective 
mechanisms for resolving SLAPP suits.60 For example, Rule 12 and 
Rule 5661 motions are relatively useless in distinguishing a SLAPP suit 
from a legitimate tort claim.62 The elements of a SLAPP suit and its 
nonmeritorious nature emerge at trial, but this is only after costly 
discovery and years of litigation.63 Defendants can retaliate with 
either Rule 1164 motions claiming frivolity, counterclaims, or SLAPP-
back suits,65 but these are also unsatisfactory. Such retaliation 
typically prolongs the litigation, is costly for defendants who might 
already be strapped for cash, and does little to alleviate the financial 
burden of a SLAPP suit. 
 
 57. See Carson Hilary Barylak, Note, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 
OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 848 (2010) (noting that many state anti-SLAPP laws are grounded in the core 
values of the First Amendment). 
 58. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. 
Div. 1994). 
 59. Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). The Citizen 
Participation Act of 2009 was introduced in December 2009 to combat SLAPP suits on a federal 
level. The Act was not passed. Bill Summary & Status: 11th Congress (2009–2010): H.R.4364, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.04364: (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
 60. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Because 
winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff’s primary motivation, defendants’ traditional safeguards 
against meritless actions, (suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of process[ and] requests for 
sanctions) are inadequate to counter SLAPPs.”). 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 62. See Jennifer E. Sills, Comment, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation): How Can the Legal System Eliminate Their Appeal?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 547, 552–
69 (1993) (noting the difficulty of obtaining an early dismissal or summary judgment in SLAPP 
suits). 
 63. See Braun, supra note 43, at 972 (explaining that SLAPP suits “look like legitimate 
actions”). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 65. A SLAPP-back suit is “an action whose aim is restitution for the injury of a SLAPP 
suit.” Braun, supra note 43, at 990. Most often, SLAPP-back suits involve a claim of malicious 
prosecution. In California, for example, “the elements of malicious prosecution are that the 
prior action: (1) was commenced by or at the discretion of the defendant and was pursued to a 
legal conclusion in the malicious prosecution plaintiff’s favor; (2) was brought (or continued) 
without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Id. 
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Prior to the enactment of anti-SLAPP laws by state legislatures, 
some courts, in recognizing the ineffectiveness of traditional defenses 
and procedural remedies, created judicial remedies to counteract the 
silencing of protected speech and costs imposed on defendants in 
SLAPP suits. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, established 
a motion to dismiss in which the moving party was required to make a 
threshold showing about the merits of her opponent’s motives.66 
Other judicial remedies included heightened pleading requirements,67 
shifting costs onto the plaintiff, and more stringent sanctions against 
frivolous lawsuits.68 Although these judicial remedies helped reduce 
the economic harm to defendants, they were piecemeal solutions that 
oftentimes failed to thwart the plaintiff’s goal of intimidating the 
defendant. 
B. Anti-SLAPP Special Motions 
To more effectively counteract the harms of SLAPP suits, 
twenty-nine states and two territories have passed anti-SLAPP laws.69 
When applied, these legislative solutions are more comprehensive 
and uniform than the aforementioned judicial remedies. 
States enact anti-SLAPP laws with the goals of shielding 
defendants from litigating against meritless claims70 and encouraging 
protected speech.71 At the core of anti-SLAPP laws are special 
motions,72 which provide a mechanism to prevent legal maneuvers 
that burden defendants and threaten statements relating to matters of 
 
 66. Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Colo. 1984) (en 
banc). 
 67. See, e.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary 
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 1976) (establishing a heightened pleading 
requirement). 
 68. See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 
26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 407–09, 416–19 (1993) (discussing the various judicial remedies); 
Cosentino, supra note 39, at 413–14 (same). 
 69. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 70. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2004) (“The Legislature finds and 
declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid 
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of 
grievances.”); id. § 425.16(b)(1) (“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech . . . shall be subject to a 
special motion to strike . . . .”). 
 71. See, e.g., id. § 425.16(a) (“The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public 
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance . . . .”). 
 72. Some states refer to these “special motions to dismiss” as “motions to strike.” E.g., 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.525 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013). 
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public interest and public participation in democratic government. 
Like a Rule 12 motion, a special motion allows a defendant to file an 
expedited motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.73 While the parties 
brief the special motion, discovery is automatically stayed.74 In ruling 
on a special motion, courts engage in a two-step analysis to determine 
whether the plaintiff’s claim has merit or is merely an attempt to 
silence or intimidate the defendant. 
First, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s protected activities—that 
is, the defendant must show that the defendant’s activities were in 
furtherance of the defendant’s right to petition or free speech under 
the federal or state constitution.75 For example, consider a tenant who 
sues her landlord for fraud and unlawful eviction. The landlord 
probably cannot prove that her activities—fraud and unlawful 
eviction—were in furtherance of the right to petition or free speech.76 
Second, if the defendant meets this burden, the burden then 
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s claim is legally 
sufficient and that each element of the plaintiff’s claim is supported 
by admissible evidence.77 Many special motions also require a 
heightened burden of the plaintiff demonstrating success on the 
 
 73. See generally Kristen Rasmussen, SLAPP Stick: Fighting Frivolous Lawsuits Against 
Journalists, 35 NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 2011, at 1 (examining the anti-SLAPP law in each 
state and showing the variations among the laws); Emily Miller, Anti-SLAPP Laws on Trial: 
Federal Courts Grapple with Applying State Libel Defense Laws, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM OF PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-
media-and-law-summer-2012/anti-slapp-laws-trial (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) (delineating the 
common procedures included in anti-SLAPP laws). 
 74. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(5)(c). 
 75. See, e.g., Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, Note, The Special Motion Requirements of the 
Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Face for Traditional Civil Practice and 
Procedure, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 106–10 (2006) (describing the procedural burdens in the 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law). 
 76. This example is drawn from Clark v. Mazgani, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24 (Ct. App. 2009). In 
Clark, the landlord filed a special motion under California’s anti-SLAPP law. Id. at 26. The 
lower court granted the special motion and dismissed the case, finding that the landlord’s 
actions were based on her constitutionally protected rights of petition. Id. The appellate court 
reversed, indicating that the landlord had “not met her threshold burden of showing this [fraud 
and unlawful eviction] suit [was] based on protected activity.” Id. at 30. This example is not 
illustrative of a typical SLAPP suit, in which a large, well-resourced corporation sues an 
individual. However, it is instructive of the defendant’s burden of demonstrating that the 
plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s protected activities. 
 77. See, e.g., Hoffberg, supra note 75, at 106–10 (describing the procedural burdens in the 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law). 
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merits.78 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the suit continues as it 
normally would, with either party free to file a Rule 12 or Rule 56 
motion before advancing to trial. 
Because it is notoriously difficult to distinguish a SLAPP suit 
from a legitimate tort suit without costly and time-consuming 
discovery,79 special motions are lauded for quickly separating 
frivolous claims from meritorious claims.80 There is the risk, however, 
that the plaintiff might not be able to prove the merits of her case on 
the pleadings alone. Easing the potential unfairness of an automatic 
discovery stay, many states permit plaintiffs to make limited discovery 
requests.81 
Beyond the core provision of the special motions, the other 
provisions in anti-SLAPP laws vary somewhat by state.82 In some 
states, successful defendants can recover attorneys’ fees and costs, 
while losing defendants may get an immediate appeal.83 Although 
these provisions are important to protecting speech on matters of 
public interest, they are secondary in importance to the special 
motions. If the plaintiff’s claims are not dismissed at an early stage in 
the litigation, there is no need to consider the possibility of attorneys’ 
fees or an immediate appeal. The special motion is thus the core of 
state anti-SLAPP laws. 
 
 78. See Braun, supra note 43, at 994 (“For [a] claim to survive, a SLAPP filer must 
demonstrate . . . a reasonable probability of success on the merits.”). 
 79. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Hoffberg, supra note 75, at 126 (“In a classic SLAPP suit that implicates the public 
interest, the anti-SLAPP statute enhances the legal system’s receptivity to ‘petitions’ by quickly 
suppressing retaliatory tort claims that merely seek to thwart the right to petition the 
government for grievances.”); Marnie Stetson, Reforming SLAPP Reform: New York’s Anti-
SLAPP Statute, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1356 (1995) (explaining that the procedural remedies 
of New York’s anti-SLAPP law “resolve quickly whether the suit is, in fact, a SLAPP[, and i]f it 
is, swift dismissal ends the chill to public participation before the filer can benefit from quieting 
the opposition”). 
 81. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(b) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(5)(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2013). 
 82. The scope of anti-SLAPP laws, however, varies substantially among states. California’s 
anti-SLAPP law, for example, expansively protects “any written or oral statement or writing 
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public 
interest.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2013). The Pennsylvania 
anti-SLAPP law, on the other hand, is much narrower and protects only persons petitioning the 
government about environmental issues. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301 (West 2009). 
 83. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.525(5)(d). 
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C. Anti-SLAPP Special Motions in Maine and the District of 
Columbia 
At issue in Godin and Boulter were the special motions to 
dismiss in the Maine84 and District of Columbia anti-SLAPP laws.85 
The laws were enacted in 199586 and 2011,87 respectively, and broadly 
encompass all written or oral statements related to issues of public 
interest.88 As with anti-SLAPP laws in other states,89 the Maine and 
District of Columbia laws were intended as mechanisms to prevent 
legal maneuvers that burden defendants and threaten the right to 
petition. There is little legislative history surrounding the Maine law,90 
but the Council of the District of Columbia Committee on Public 
Safety and the Judiciary reported that the District of Columbia law 
was intended to “incorporat[e] substantive rights that allow a 
defendant to more expeditiously, and more equitably, dispense of a 
SLAPP.”91 The substantive rights refer to the “defendant’s ability to 
fend off lawsuits . . . aimed to punish or prevent the expression of 
opposing points of view.”92 
 
 84. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003 & Supp. 2012). 
 85. D.C. CODE § 16-5502 (2001 & Supp. 2013). 
 86. An Act Protecting a Citizen’s Right of Petition Under the Constitution, 1995 Me. Laws 
780 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556). 
 87. Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010, 58 D.C. Reg. 741 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at D.C. CODE § 16-
5502). 
 88. D.C. CODE § 16-5502; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. 
 89. For a more extensive analysis of anti-SLAPP laws in other states, see generally Braun, 
supra note 43; Sheri Coover, Note, Pennsylvania Anti-SLAPP Legislation, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 263 (2004); Hoffberg, supra note 75; Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New Anti-SLAPP 
Law, 61 J. MO. B. 124 (2005); Laura Long, Note, SLAPPing Around the First Amendment: An 
Analysis of Oklahoma’s Anti-SLAPP Statute and Its Implications on the Right To Petition, 60 
OKLA. L. REV. 419 (2007); Edward W. McBride, Jr., Note, The Empire State SLAPPs Back: 
New York’s Legislative Response to SLAPP Suits, 17 VT. L. REV. 925 (1993); Mark J. Sobczak, 
Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation 
Act, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 559 (2008); and Tom Wyrwich, Comment, A Cure for a “Public 
Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663 (2011). 
 90. See John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, Maine’s Anti-SLAPP Law: Special Protection 
Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning, 23 ME. B.J. 32, 34 (2008) 
(“[The Maine law came] out of the legislature’s Judiciary Committee without debate or written 
testimony and with the committee’s unanimous support.”). 
 91. Memorandum from Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of the D.C. Comm. on Public 
Safety and the Judiciary, to Councilmembers, Council of D.C., Report on Bill 18-893, “Anti-
SLAPP Act of 2010,” at 1 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/
images/00001/20110120184936.pdf. 
 92. Id. 
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At the core of both laws are the special motions. Overall, the 
special motions follow the same general framework and are 
representative of special motions in other states. After the defendant 
files a special motion within a set time frame,93 the court prioritizes 
the special motion and issues a ruling as quickly as possible.94 In 
assessing the special motion, the court looks to the pleadings and 
supporting affidavits.95 Discovery is automatically stayed unless good 
cause is shown and such discovery would not be unduly burdensome.96 
The court first determines the threshold matter of whether the 
claim at issue is based on the defendant’s exercise of her right to 
petition.97 If it is, the plaintiff has an opportunity, but is not required, 
to show that the claim is legally valid. Under the Maine law, the court 
will grant the special motion unless the plaintiff “shows that [the 
defendant’s] exercise of [the defendant’s] right of petition was devoid 
of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and 
that the [defendant’s] acts caused actual injury to the [plaintiff].”98 
Pursuant to the District of Columbia law, the court will grant the 
special motion unless the plaintiff shows “that the claim is likely to 
succeed on the merits.”99 
Although the burden language of the laws differs, the effect is 
the same. Both laws, upon a defendant’s motion, shift the burden to 
the plaintiff to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of her claim. For 
example, take a situation in which a plaintiff files a complaint alleging 
that a defendant defamed her. Under the Maine law, the plaintiff has 
the burden of showing that the defendant’s statements or actions 
were without a factual basis and caused injury to the plaintiff100—the 
 
 93. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(a); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. 
 94. The District of Columbia law requires the court to prioritize the special motion, D.C. 
CODE § 16-5502(d), whereas the Maine law gives the court some discretion over this decision, 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. 
 95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. The District of Columbia law does not have an 
explicit provision for this, but the District Court for the District of Columbia has looked to 
pleadings and supporting affidavits in determining whether D.C. Code § 16-5502 applies in 
federal court. See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 100–04 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing the 
court’s procedure for handling special motions and holding that the District of Columbia’s anti-
SLAPP law did not apply in a federal court sitting in diversity).  
 96. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(c); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.  
 97. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. 
 98. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556.  
 99. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b). 
 100. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. 
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very elements of a defamation claim.101 In other words, the onus is on 
the plaintiff to show that her defamation claim is legally valid. 
Similarly, under the District of Columbia law, the plaintiff has the 
burden of showing that her defamation claim is likely to succeed on 
the merits.102 In other words, the effect of the two laws is the same: 
both shift the burden to the plaintiff and require the plaintiff to justify 
her claim.103 The anti-SLAPP laws in Maine and the District of 
Columbia thus follow similar procedures and are representative of 
anti-SLAPP laws in other states. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF SHADY GROVE 
The question of whether state or federal law applies in federal 
courts sitting in diversity has perplexed courts for over a century. It is 
well established that a federal court sitting in diversity applies state 
substantive law and federal procedural rules.104 What is less certain is 
how to distinguish between substantive law and procedural rules. The 
most recent Supreme Court foray into this perplexing realm is Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. At issue 
in Shady Grove was whether Rule 23,105 which governs the 
prerequisites for maintaining a class action,106 conflicts with a New 
York law restricting class actions in suits seeking penalties or 
statutory-minimum damages.107 This Part summarizes the three 
 
 101. See Morgan v. Kooistra, 941 A.2d 447, 455 (Me. 2008) (“Defamation consists of: (a) a 
false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third 
party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either 
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm 
caused by the publication.”). 
 102. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b). 
 103. Beyond the special motions, there are three subtle distinctions between the Maine law 
and the District of Columbia law. The distinctions are minor and should not lead to inferences 
that the Maine and the District of Columbia laws are significantly different. First, the Maine law 
permits courts discretion to give defendants more time to file a special motion, ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 14, § 556, whereas the District of Columbia law sets a hard, nonnegotiable deadline, 
D.C. CODE § 16-5502(a). Second, the Maine law does not require courts to dismiss special 
motions with prejudice, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556, whereas the District of Columbia 
law does require dismissal with prejudice, D.C. CODE § 16-5502(d). Third, the Maine law lacks a 
special motion to quash discovery orders, requests, or subpoenas which seek personal 
identifying information, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556, whereas the District of Columbia 
law provides for a special motion to quash, D.C. CODE § 16-5503. 
 104. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).  
 105. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2010). 
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opinions in Shady Grove—Justice Scalia’s plurality, Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.108 The three approaches 
provide significant insight, but not much guidance to lower courts in 
resolving whether state substantive law or federal procedural rules 
apply in federal court. 
A. Justice Scalia’s Really-Regulates-Procedure Approach 
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia opined that the state law and 
federal rule conflict, and that the federal rule applied because it 
“really regulates procedure.”109 Justice Scalia first looked to whether 
the state law and federal rule conflict.110 He stressed that state laws 
and federal rules conflict when the text of the federal rule is 
sufficiently broad—that is, when the text of the federal rule “leaves 
no room for special exemptions based on the function or purpose of a 
particular state rule.”111 Justice Scalia characterized the issue before 
the Court as whether the suit could proceed as a class action.112 Rule 
23 permits this, but the New York law prevents it.113 Thus, the laws 
“undeniably” both attempt to “answer the same question” and cannot 
operate alongside each other.114 
After deeming that the state law and federal rule conflict, Justice 
Scalia questioned whether applying the federal rule was a valid 
exercise of the federal rulemaking power under the REA.115 The REA 
grants the Court “the power to prescribe general [federal] rules of 
practice and procedure”116 but stipulates that federal rules shall “not 
 
 108. In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia filed an opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Thomas joined in full. Id. at 395–96. Justice Sotomayor joined parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-
D of Justice Scalia’s opinion. Id. at 396. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg filed a 
dissenting opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito joined. Id. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 411 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1940)) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Id. at 398–406 (majority opinion). 
 111. Id. at 412 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.). Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence succinctly phrased this inquiry as whether the “scope of the federal rule is 
‘sufficiently broad’ to ‘control the issue’ before the court, ‘thereby leaving no room for the 
operation’ of seemingly conflicting state law.” Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)). 
 112. Id. at 398 (majority opinion). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 401. 
 115. Id. at 409. 
 116. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
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abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”117 Justice Scalia 
interpreted a valid exercise of a federal rule under the REA as 
meaning that the federal rule must “really regulate[] procedure.”118 
The substantive nature or purpose of the state law “makes no 
difference.”119 Even if the state law has practical effects on a party’s 
rights and remedies, the state law “regulate[s] only the process for 
enforcing those rights.”120 Justice Scalia stressed the ease of 
administration and uniformity of this really-regulates-procedure 
approach,121 even if it might be “hard to square” with the language of 
the REA.122 Without further guidance, Justice Scalia concluded that 
Rule 23 really regulates the procedure of class actions and thus is 
valid under the REA.123 
B.  Justice Stevens’s Sufficiently Interwoven Approach 
Justice Stevens concurred with Justice Scalia’s conclusion but 
disagreed with his methodology. Signing on to part of Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens agreed that the New York law 
conflicts with Rule 23.124 Justice Stevens also agreed that Rule 23 was 
a valid exercise of rulemaking authority under the REA.125 Criticizing 
Justice Scalia’s unfaithfulness to the text of the REA, however, 
Justice Stevens dismissed Justice Scalia’s really-regulates-procedure 
approach.126 
Writing alone, Justice Stevens interpreted a valid exercise of 
federal rulemaking as meaning that the federal rule cannot displace a 
state law that is procedural but “so intertwined with a state right or 
remedy that [the state law] functions to define the scope of the state-
 
 117. Id. § 2072(b). 
 118. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 119. Id. at 409 (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Id. at 407. 
 121. See id. at 413 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.) (noting that 
this procedural test was “driven by the very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from 
State to State would be chaos”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 408–09 (plurality opinion) (implying that Rule 23, which here turns ten 
thousand $500 claims into a single $5 million claim, does not substantially affect the plaintiffs’ 
remedies and thus “really regulates procedure”). 
 124. Id. at 401 (majority opinion). 
 125. Id. at 431–36 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. at 426–28. 
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created right.”127 Beyond examining the federal rule, Justice Stevens 
also looked at the substantive and extrinsic policy reasons behind the 
state law.128 Justice Stevens emphasized that courts must determine 
“whether the state law actually is part of a State’s framework of 
substantive rights or remedies,”129 and that the federal rule is valid if it 
does not intrude into these substantive rights.130 Justice Stevens also 
stressed that the “bar for finding an [REA] problem is a high one”131 
and requires more than a “mere possibility that a federal rule would 
alter a state-created right.”132 Without much explanation,133 Justice 
Stevens reasoned that Rule 23 does not intrude on state substantive 
rights because the New York law is not “so bound up with [a] state-
created right or remedy.”134 Rule 23 is thus a valid exercise of 
rulemaking authority.135 
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Relatively Unguided Approach 
Justice Ginsburg dissented, urging that the state law and federal 
rule do not conflict, and that the state law applied because it advances 
litigant equality.136 Like Justices Scalia and Stevens, Justice Ginsburg 
agreed that the first question is whether the federal rule leaves no 
room for the operation of the state law.137 Unlike Justices Scalia and 
Stevens, however, Justice Ginsburg added a threshold inquiry—
whether conflict between the state law and federal rule is “really 
 
 127. Id. at 423.  
 128. See id. at 429–36 (outlining the legislative history and possible interpretations of the 
New York law). 
 129. Id. at 419. 
 130. See id. at 424–25 (criticizing Justice Scalia for ignoring “the balance that Congress 
struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its 
own rights and remedies” and the “separation-of-powers presumption, and federalism 
presumption, that counsel against judicially created rules displacing state substantive law” 
(citations omitted)). 
 131. Id. at 432. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Justice Stevens did explain that although class certification could enlarge New York’s 
limited damages remedy, this involved extensive speculation and thus was “just a possibility.” 
Id. at 434–36. 
 134. Id. at 420, 434–36 
 135. See id. at 432 (“It is . . . hard to see how [the New York law] could be understood as a 
rule that, though procedural in form, serves the function of defining New York’s rights or 
remedies.”). 
 136. Id. at 445–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 439. 
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necessary?”138 Embracing a “vigilant[] read[ing] [of] the Federal Rules 
to avoid conflict with state laws,”139 Justice Ginsburg stressed that, 
often, such conflict is unnecessary.140 After examining the text of the 
federal rule and the purpose and legislative history of the New York 
law,141 Justice Ginsburg found that Rule 23 and the New York law 
serve different goals: Rule 23 addresses certification of class actions, 
whereas the New York law focuses on remedies, specifically 
statutory-damages caps.142 In avoiding conflict, Justice Ginsburg 
steered away from the REA analysis into a relatively unguided Erie 
analysis.143 
Under this approach, Justice Ginsburg explained that if the state 
law is inseparably connected with an underlying substantive state 
right, this strongly supports applying the state law.144 On the other 
hand, if applying state law would alter or disrupt an essential 
characteristic of the federal court system, this strongly supports 
applying the federal rule or practice.145 She also stressed the 
advancement of litigant equality, or the twin aims of Erie—that is, the 
 
 138. Id. at 437 
 139. Id. at 439.  
 140. See id. at 442 (“In sum, both before and after Hanna, the above-described decisions 
show, federal courts have been cautioned by this Court to ‘interpre[t] the Federal Rules . . . with 
sensitivity to important state interests’ and a will ‘to avoid conflict with important state 
regulatory policies . . . .’” (first two alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Gasperini 
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7, 438 n.22 (1996))). 
 141. See id. at 437–39, 443, 448 n.7 (criticizing the plurality’s interpretation of Rule 23 as 
“mechanical,” “insensitive,” and “relentless”). 
 142. See id. at 447 (“Rule 23 describes a method of enforcing a claim for relief, while [the 
New York law] defines the dimensions of the claim itself.”); id. at 446 (“The Court . . . finds 
conflict where none is necessary.”). 
 143. The phrase “relatively unguided approach” or “relatively unguided Erie analysis” 
stems from an earlier case, Hanna v. Plumer. In Hanna, the Supreme Court stressed that when 
there is no federal rule or statute on point, “the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice” 
controls. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in 
Shady Grove briefly discussed this relatively unguided approach. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416 
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg went into greater detail of this approach in Shady 
Grove but did not use the phrase “relatively unguided” to describe her framework. Id. at 452–58 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 144. See id. at 457–58 (“We have long recognized the impropriety of displacing, in a 
diversity action, state-law limitations on state-created remedies.”). 
 145. See id. at 439 (“In our prior decisions in point, many of them not mentioned in the 
Court’s opinion, we have avoided immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that would 
trench on state prerogatives without serving any countervailing federal interest.”); see also Byrd 
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (concluding that the 
constitutional right to a jury trial and the corresponding federal policy was an essential 
characteristic of the federal court system that outweighed a South Carolina law requiring a 
judge to decide whether an employer was immune from liability). 
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federal rule should apply only when it (1) will not lead to forum 
shopping and (2) avoids the inequitable administration of justice.146 
In articulating this, Justice Ginsburg repeatedly emphasized 
“sensitivity to important state interests”147 and deference to state 
regulatory interests.148 Returning to the issue at hand, Justice 
Ginsburg reasoned that New York had a strong interest in prohibiting 
statutory damages in class actions and the New York law was 
inseparably connected with these important state rights; thus, she 
concluded the New York law should apply.149 
D. Unanswered Questions 
The three opinions in Shady Grove leave many questions 
unresolved. In determining whether the federal rule is “‘sufficiently 
broad’ to ‘control the issue’ before the [c]ourt,”150 it is unclear how 
broadly courts should frame the issue and construe the federal rule. It 
is also unclear if courts should engage in an REA analysis, or in 
Justice Ginsburg’s relatively unguided analysis. In an REA analysis, 
there is an open question as to whether Justice Scalia’s 
characterization of federal rules as procedural if they really regulate 
procedure undercuts the text of the REA. There is also an open 
question as to what Justice Stevens meant by his murky wording of 
“sufficiently interwoven” with state rights.151 
III.  TWO DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS OF SHADY GROVE 
This lack of guidance has resulted in a hodgepodge of rulings by 
lower courts.152 Some lower courts have deemed that federal rules and 
state laws conflict and have adhered to Justice Scalia’s really-
 
 146. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that 
federal courts must “apply state law when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and 
yield markedly disparate litigation outcomes”). 
 147. Id. at 442 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)). 
 148. See id. at 438–43 (listing past decisions in which the Supreme Court deferred to state 
interests). 
 149. See id. 452–58 (describing New York’s numerous state interests). 
 150. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 
1, 4–5 (1987)). 
 151. Id. at 429. 
 152. See Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark: One Year Later, Shady 
Grove’s Meaning Remains Unclear, ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 75, 78–80 (summarizing how 
lower courts have reached different conclusions in cases involving similar facts). 
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regulates-procedure approach,153 whereas others have followed Justice 
Stevens’s sufficiently interwoven approach.154 Still others have 
effectively embraced Justice Ginsburg’s relatively unguided approach 
and avoided finding conflict.155 This Part examines how two lower 
courts, the First Circuit and the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, have struggled to make sense of Shady Grove in the 
context of state anti-SLAPP laws.156 Faced with the same legal 
question and a nearly identical state law, the two courts latched on to 
different approaches and came to different conclusions in interpreting 
Shady Grove. 
A. Godin v. Schencks 
The First Circuit in Godin declined to follow Justice Scalia’s 
really-regulates-procedure approach or Justice Stevens’s sufficiently 
interwoven approach in Shady Grove and instead drew from Justice 
Ginsburg’s relatively unguided approach157 to hold that Maine’s anti-
 
 153. See, e.g., Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding 
conflict and examining the purposes of the federal rule); Durmishi v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 720 F. 
Supp. 2d 862, 876–77 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (same). 
 154. See, e.g., Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 983–85 (10th Cir. 
2010) (finding conflict and examining the purposes of the state law); Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752 
F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (same). 
 155. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335–37 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding 
no conflict); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1278–80 (10th Cir. 2011) (same). 
 156. The District Court for the District of Columbia also examined this issue in Sherrod v. 
Breitbart, 843 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2012). The defendant’s special motion was denied, and the 
court held that the anti-SLAPP law was substantive and thus applicable in federal court. Id. at 
85–86. The analysis was limited; the judge provided only a “statement of reasons” to explain his 
ruling. Id. at 84 & n.2. A few other courts have also considered this issue in the context of state 
anti-SLAPP laws, albeit with less analysis than the First Circuit or the District Court for the 
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. 
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999); La. Crisis Assistance 
Ctr. v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 827 F. Supp. 2d 668 (E.D. La. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 878 
F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. La. 2012); Trudeau v. ConsumerAffairs.com, Inc., No. 10 C 7193, 2011 
WL 3898041 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2011); Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, No. 
10 C 6682, 2011 WL 2182106 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2011). 
 157. The First Circuit did not explicitly follow Justice Ginsburg’s approach but shared her 
reluctance to find unnecessary conflict amongst federal rules and state laws. See Godin v. 
Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) (“We conclude that neither [Rule] 12(b)(6) nor [Rule] 
56, on a straightforward reading of its language, was meant to control the particular issues under 
Section 556 before the district court. Given this result we do not reach the next level question as 
to whether Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 comply with the Rules Enabling Act.”). Like Justice 
Ginsburg, the court also looked to past cases and history in finding no conflict. Id. at 88. 
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SLAPP special motion does not conflict with Rule 12158 and that the 
special motion should apply in federal court, as it advances litigant 
equality.159 
Like Justice Ginsburg’s narrow reading of Rule 23 in Shady 
Grove, the court narrowly read Rule 12 to avoid conflict with the 
special motion. Looking beyond the text of the anti-SLAPP law to its 
purpose and legislative history, the court found that the special 
motion applies to pretrial dispositions of claims based on a 
defendant’s petitioning activity.160 Rule 12, on the other hand, applies 
to pretrial dispositions of all claims.161 The state legislature also 
created the special motion to supplement its procedural rules and “to 
provide added protections, beyond those in Rule[] 12.”162 The 
legislature did not intend the special motion “to displace the Federal 
Rules or have [them] cease to function.”163 
In finding no conflict between Rule 12 and the special motion, 
the court also stressed the different mechanisms and procedural 
burdens. It reasoned that Rule 12 and the special motion are both 
“mechanisms to efficiently dispose with meritless claims before 
trial.”164 However, the special motion provides a mechanism to 
specifically test whether a defendant’s petitioning is the kind of 
activity that Maine has deemed should be protected.165 In contrast, 
Rule 12 provides a mechanism to test for the sufficiency of a case 
 
 158. Id. at 92. The court focused its analysis on both Rules 12 and 56, recognizing that 
special motions can be limited to the pleadings or include matters presented outside the 
pleadings. Id. at 87–91. In cases in which special motions are limited to the pleadings, the special 
motions run up against Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which generally look only to the pleadings. See 
id. at 90 (“Some Section 556 motions, like Rule 12(b)(6) motions, will be resolved on the 
pleadings.” (footnote omitted)). In cases in which special motions include affidavits and limited 
discovery outside the pleadings, the special motions run up against Rule 12(d) motions for 
matters outside the pleadings, which trigger Rule 56 motions. See id. (“In other cases, Section 
556 will permit courts to look beyond the pleadings to affidavits and materials of record, as Rule 
56 does.”). For a discussion of the relationship between Rule 12(d) and Rule 56, see infra note 
175. 
 159. Id. at 92. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that that there was appellate 
jurisdiction over the procedural question at issue. Id. at 84–85. The court reserved the question 
of whether there would be appellate jurisdiction over a ruling on the merits. Id. at 84. 
 160. Id. at 88. 
 161. See id. (“Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 do not purport to apply only to suits challenging the 
defendants’ exercise of their constitutional petitioning rights.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.; see also id. at 89 n.16 (“Such an abstracted framing of the breadth of the Federal 
Rules is inappropriate.”). 
 165. Id. at 89. 
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before trial and allows for dismissal if sufficiency is found to be 
lacking.166 Moreover, unlike Rule 12, the special motion imposes a 
higher onus on a plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s allegations about 
a defendant’s conduct have a reasonable basis in law or fact, and that 
the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury.167 Given these different 
mechanisms and burdens, the court concluded that Rule 12 and the 
special motion could “exist side by side” and each could “control[] its 
own intended sphere of coverage.”168 
Continuing to draw from Justice Ginsburg’s relatively unguided 
approach, the court emphasized that the special motion is inseparably 
connected with state rights and remedies.169 The court did not 
elaborate on what these rights are but suggested that they encompass 
substantive state rights.170 As the court noted, if there were a conflict 
between Rule 12 and the special motion, a “serious question might be 
raised under the [REA]”171 and disregarding the special motion might 
violate substantive state rights.172 Finally, the court emphasized that 
failing to apply the special motion would result in an inequitable 
administration of justice “between [the same] defense[s] asserted in 
state court and . . . federal court” and could lead to forum shopping.173 
The court held that the special motion must apply in federal court.174 
 
 166. See id. (“Rule 12(b)(6) serves to provide a mechanism to test the sufficiency of the 
complaint. Section 556, by contrast, provides a mechanism for a defendant to move to dismiss a 
claim on an entirely different basis: that the claims in question rest on the defendant’s protected 
petitioning conduct and that the plaintiff cannot meet the special rules Maine has created to 
protect such petitioning activity against lawsuits.” (citation omitted) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009))). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 91 (quoting United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 
F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1999)) (quotation mark omitted). 
 169. Id. at 91–92. 
 170. See id. at 91 (noting that the special motion “substantively alters Maine-law claims that 
are based on a defendant’s protected petitioning activity by shifting the burden to the plaintiff 
and altering the showing the plaintiff must make”). 
 171. Id. at 90. 
 172. See id. at 89 (“Because Section 556 is ‘so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it 
functions to define the scope of the state-created right,’ it cannot be displaced by Rule 
12(b)(6).” (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 423 
(2011))). 
 173. Id. at 92. 
 174. Id. at 86. 
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B. 3M Co. v. Boulter 
Conversely, the District Court for the District of Columbia in 
Boulter followed Justice Scalia’s really-regulates-procedure approach 
to hold that the special motion conflicts with Rule 12, and that, given 
its procedural characteristics, Rule 12 should apply in federal court.175 
Like Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the text of Rule 23 and the 
New York law in Shady Grove, the court focused on the text of Rule 
12 and the special motion and found that they address the same 
subject matter—whether a defendant can dismiss a plaintiff’s claim.176 
Like Rule 12, the special motion “allows a defendant on a preliminary 
basis to deal a deathly blow to a plaintiff’s claim on the merits based 
either on the pleadings or on matters outside the pleadings.”177 The 
court also recognized that the special motion imposes a higher 
procedural burden on plaintiffs to show that “the plaintiff is more 
likely than not to succeed on the merits.”178 The special motion thus 
“restricts ‘the procedural right to maintain [an action]’ established by 
the federal rules and squarely conflicts”179 with Rule 12.180 
After concluding that Rule 12 and the special motion conflict, 
the court looked to whether Rule 12 was a valid exercise of authority 
under the REA.181 The court stressed that pleading standards and 
summary judgment rules are “classic examples of appropriate 
procedural rules,”182 and Rule 12 thus really regulates procedure.183 
Straying slightly from Justice Scalia’s approach, the court also looked 
to the purpose of the special motion. Without any meaningful 
analysis, the court concluded that the special motion does not 
 
 175. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2012). Like the First Circuit, the 
court focused on Rule 12(b)(6) for motions to dismiss that are limited to the pleadings and Rule 
12(d) motions to dismiss that include matters asserted outside the pleadings. Id. at 103. The 
court devoted several pages to explaining that a 12(d) motion for matters outside the pleadings 
is “treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 96–101. 
 176. Id. at 101–02. 
 177. Id. at 102. 
 178. Id. The court compared the procedural burden of the special motion to the burden of 
Rule 56 motions (via 12(d) motions). Id. The court did not consider the burden of 12(b)(6) 
motions, though it later paired Rule 12 and 56 motions together. Id. 
 179. Id. at 103 (first alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 401 n.4 (2011)). 
 180. Id. at 101. 
 181. Id. at 110–11. 
 182. Id. at 110. 
 183. See id. (“Given the procedural characteristics of Rule 12(d) and Rule 56, they fall 
squarely within the proper scope of the Rules Enabling Act.”). 
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“‘serve[] the function of defining [state] rights or remedies’”184 and is a 
procedural rule “clothe[d] in the costume of the substantive right of 
immunity.”185 Recognizing that this conclusion was contrary to the 
weight of authority,186 the court nevertheless held that the special 
motion does not apply in federal court.187 
* * * 
Reconciling Godin and Boulter is difficult. In both cases, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made false statements against 
them. Perhaps sympathies lie more with Godin, a fired elementary-
school principal, than 3M, a multinational company, but this should 
not determinatively sway the outcome. The claims themselves are 
comparable: Godin involved contract-interference and defamation 
claims and Boulter involved a defamation claim.188 The state anti-
SLAPP laws are similar: both are grounded in First Amendment 
rights and provide a mechanism to dismiss SLAPP suits early. 
Moreover, both laws, upon a defendant’s motion, shift the burden 
onto the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s claim is legally valid.189 
IV.  CLARIFYING SHADY GROVE IN THE CONTEXT OF ANTI-SLAPP 
LAWS 
The puzzle thus becomes how to clarify the three opinions 
articulated in Shady Grove to align with precedent and also provide 
more guidance going forward. Drawing from the three respective 
opinions in Shady Grove, this Part sets forth a more nuanced, two-
pronged interpretation for determining the applicability of state laws 
in federal courts sitting in diversity. 
 
 184. Id. at 111 (second alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 185. Id.; see id. at 110–11 (“[T]he D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act is codified with procedural matters 
in the D.C.Code [sic], and the Act applies to all claims, not just to claims brought under District 
law, seriously undermining any contention that the Act ‘serves the function of defining [state] 
rights or remedies.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 432 
(Stevens, J., concurring))). 
 186. See id. at 107–10 (distinguishing opinions from other courts, including the First Circuit 
in Godin). 
 187. Id. at 111. 
 188. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2010); Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 88.   
 189. For a more extensive overview of the Maine and District of Columbia anti-SLAPP 
special motion procedures, see supra Part I.C. 
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The first prong of the interpretation focuses on textual conflict 
between federal rules and state laws. When faced with a competing 
federal rule and state law, courts should broadly construe the issue 
before the court and compare, side by side, the text of the federal rule 
and state law. Federal rules and state laws should be deemed to 
conflict when the federal rule leaves no room for the operation of the 
state law. This ensures that the issue will not be narrowly construed 
and subsequently diverted toward the relatively unguided approach 
instead of the REA inquiry. The second prong of the interpretation 
focuses on the balancing of federal and state interests under the 
REA. Once a conflict is deemed to exist, in determining the validity 
of the federal rule, courts should look to the state’s purpose in 
enacting the law. These state interests should weigh heavily but also 
balance with the federal interest in creating a uniform system of 
procedure. Unlike the Justices’ one-sided foci on either federal or 
state interests in Shady Grove, this two-pronged interpretation 
ensures that both federal and state interests are given fair and 
balanced consideration. 
This Part then uses this interpretation to determine how state 
anti-SLAPP special motions should be treated in federal courts. The 
text of Rule 12 and special motions are examined and the issue is 
construed broadly, such that Rule 12 is deemed to conflict with the 
special motions. Next, the state interests in enacting anti-SLAPP laws 
and the federal interests in uniformity are balanced. The state 
interests weigh more heavily than the federal interests, and thus, 
special motions—not Rule 12—should apply in federal courts sitting 
in diversity. 
A. The First Prong: Textual Conflict 
When faced with a federal rule and state law that are at odds, the 
first inquiry should be whether the federal rule is “‘sufficiently broad’ 
to ‘control the issue’ before the court, ‘thereby leaving no room for 
the operation’ of seemingly conflicting state law.”190 The three 
opinions in Shady Grove agreed on this, yet disagreed as to how to 
frame the issue and to discern the breadth of the federal rule. Broadly 
construing the issue before the court and then comparing side by side 
the “clear text”191—rather than the underlying purposes of the federal 
 
 190. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. 
v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987)). 
 191. Id. at 403 (majority opinion). 
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rule and state law—ensures that this first prong functions as a wide 
funnel that feeds into the second prong (the REA inquiry). 
Moreover, this shifts the bulk of the analysis—the purpose inquiry 
and balancing of state and federal interests—onto the second prong 
and enhances judicial economy. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Shady Grove broadly construed the 
issue before the Court: when a class action can be certified.192 This is 
consistent with prior cases in which the Court has dictated that 
federal rules should not “be narrowly construed in order to avoid a 
‘direct collision’ with state law.”193 Justice Scalia’s opinion held that 
Rule 23 leaves no room for the operation of state law, as Rule 23 
“unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil 
proceeding, to maintain a class action.”194 This holding harkens back 
to Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,195 in which the Court 
emphasized that examining the text is a quick and efficient way to 
compare state laws and federal rules. In Burlington, the Court parsed 
the text of an Alabama law and Rule 38196 to conclude that Rule 38’s 
“discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the 
mandatory provision of Alabama’s affirmance penalty statute.”197 
Dissenting in Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg narrowly construed 
the issue before the Court to focus on the availability of remedies, 
rather than certifying a class action.198 Justice Ginsburg looked to both 
the text and the purpose of the New York law.199 As a result, this 
strained interpretation skirted the REA inquiry and passed into the 
relatively unguided approach200 in which the state law is applied if it 
advances litigant equality and there is no countervailing federal 
interest.201 
 
 192. Id. at 398. 
 193. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S 460, 472 (1965)). 
 194. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406. 
 195. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 196. FED. R. CIV. P. 38. 
 197. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 480 U.S. at 7. 
 198. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Rule 23 describes a 
method of enforcing a claim for relief, while [the New York law] defines the dimensions of the 
claim itself.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S 460, 471 (1965) (describing the Erie approach as 
“relatively unguided”). 
 201. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 438–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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It is far preferable to assess the validity of federal rules under the 
REA, rather than the relatively unguided approach. Skirting the 
REA for the relatively unguided approach encourages courts to 
engage in clever interpretations that overweigh the true meaning of 
state laws. When a federal rule and state law are deemed not to 
conflict, the state regulatory interest almost always trumps.202 As one 
commentator has noted, “The outcome of a[] . . . case should not 
depend on how far the language of a statute can be stretched.”203 
These linguistic gymnastics can also twist the meaning of the federal 
rules, and “[the federal rules] should not suffer contortion by 
aggressively narrow readings.”204 
Moreover, conflating the text and purpose focuses prematurely 
on the underlying state and federal interests.205 Focusing on these 
policy considerations too early leads to a haphazard approach that “is 
simply inadequate to protect substantive rights created by state 
law.”206 As Justice Scalia cautioned in Shady Grove, it is difficult and 
“arduous” for courts to discern all the state interests at this point in 
the analysis.207 Looking into the minds of a legislature is taxing, and 
pinpointing a single purpose for a state law can prove impossible.208 
There is no real necessity to wade into this purpose inquiry in the first 
prong and identify some, but not all, of the state interests. At the 
second prong, as discussed below, there is an aggressive examination 
of the state and federal interests.209 In the interest of judicial economy 
 
 202. See infra notes 239–52. 
 203. Redfern, supra note 35, at 401. 
 204. Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
987, 1027 (2011). 
 205. Many past Supreme Court cases have narrowly interpreted the issue and mistakenly 
combined a textual examination with the underlying purposes of the federal rule and state law. 
See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422–24 (1996) (failing to broadly 
characterize the issue as the standard of review for an excessive jury award in assessing a 
conflict between Rule 59 and a New York law); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 742 
(1980) (skewing the meaning of “commenced” in examining whether Rule 3 and an Oklahoma 
law conflict). 
 206. Redfern, supra note 35, at 401; see Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 418 (plurality opinion) 
(stressing the Supreme Court’s “sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” 
(quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 207. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 404. 
 208. See id. (“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict 
based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce 
‘confusion worse confounded.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 
14 (1941))). 
 209. In this respect, this Note’s proposed two-pronged interpretation is somewhat analogous 
to that of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
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it is preferable to create a firm line between the two prongs and 
refrain from looking at the state and federal interests twice.210 
Thus, construing the issue broadly and examining only the text of 
the federal rule and state law encourage assessment of the federal 
rule under the REA, rather than the relatively unguided approach. 
This also ensures that the bulk of the analysis occurs at the second 
prong, enhancing judicial economy. 
B. Applying the First Prong: Textual Conflict 
Applying this first prong to state anti-SLAPP special motions, it 
is undeniable that Rule 12 and special motions have different 
breadths and procedural burdens that cause special motions to 
conflict with Rule 12. 
First, Rule 12 and special motions both provide for expedited 
motions that test the legal sufficiency of a claim about a defendant’s 
petitioning activity. Rule 12 indicates that a party, relying only on the 
pleadings, may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.”211 Similarly, special motions—specifically 
the special motions in Maine and the District of Columbia—also 
allow a party to move to dismiss if the claim is based on the 
defendant’s exercise of her right to petition.212 
The First Circuit in Godin suggested that Rule 12 and special 
motions could coexist, as one tests the sufficiency of all claims 
whereas the other tests only whether a defendant’s petitioning 
 
in the administrative law context. At the first prong, like in Chevron’s step one, the analysis is 
purely textual. See id. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear [from the statute], that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”). In contrast, at the second prong, like in Chevron’s step two, the 
analysis engages other tools of statutory interpretation—purpose and legislative history—and is 
more thorough. See id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”). Admittedly, it can be difficult to look at a text in the abstract and 
give it any definitive meaning without a purpositivist gloss. Courts have struggled with 
delineating the Chevron line and undoubtedly could also struggle with delineating this proposed 
two-pronged interpretation. See generally, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 395 (2007) (criticizing the “mess” that Chevron has created). 
 210. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits 
of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 977 (2011) (“The waters of Erie will never be crystal 
clear . . . . But navigating them can be far simpler and more expeditious under the Shady Grove 
plurality approach . . . .”).  
 211. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 212. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b) (2001 & Supp. 2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003 
& Supp. 2012). 
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activity should be protected.213 Broadly construed, the issue before the 
court was whether a defendant can dismiss a plaintiff’s claim, 
specifically a plaintiff’s claim about a defendant’s petitioning activity. 
Rule 12 is sufficiently broad to control this issue. As in Shady Grove, 
Rule 12 covers a much wider breadth than special motions. In Shady 
Grove, the New York law applied only to some plaintiffs and Rule 23 
applied to all plaintiffs.214 Here, the special motion applies only to 
claims involving petitioning activity, and Rule 12 applies to all claims. 
The all-encompassing federal rule thus swallows up the special 
motions and prevents any coexistence. Rule 12 leaves no room for the 
operation of special motions. 
Second, beyond the breadth of Rule 12 and special motions, the 
different procedural burdens of Rule 12 and special motions point 
toward conflict. Rule 12 places the onus on the moving party to 
demonstrate the legal insufficiency of the responding party’s claim—
that is, to show that the responding party has failed to state a claim.215 
Special motions shift this burden onto the nonmoving party (the 
plaintiff) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of her claim.216 As the 
District Court in Boulter noted, the burden shift in the special motion 
“restricts ‘the procedural right to maintain [an action]’ established by 
the federal rules.”217 These different procedural burdens preclude the 
coexistence of Rule 12 and the special motions. 
Thus, adhering to the text and broadly construing the issue 
before the court, lower courts should deem that Rule 12 conflicts with 
state anti-SLAPP special motions. Rule 12 casts a wider net over the 
issue before the court, and the different procedural burdens of Rule 
12 and special motions point toward conflict. 
 
 213. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Rule 12(b)(6) serves to provide 
a mechanism to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Section 556, by contrast, provides a 
mechanism for a defendant to move to dismiss a claim on an entirely different basis . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
 214. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co, 559 U.S. 393, 396–98 
(2010) (noting that Rule 23 “creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the 
specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action,” whereas the “New York law prohibits 
class actions in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum damages”). 
 215. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 216. D.C. CODE § 16-5502(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556. 
 217. 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2012) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 401 n.4). 
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C. The Second Prong: Balancing State and Federal Interests 
Once a conflict is determined, the bulk of the analysis should 
address the validity of the federal rule under the REA. The REA 
grants the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general [federal] 
rules of practice and procedure”218 but stipulates that the federal rules 
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”219 Rather 
than characterizing federal rules as procedural or substantive, it is 
useful to look at the REA as a balancing of state and federal interests: 
a respect for state regulatory policies balanced with the desire for a 
uniform system of federal procedure. Balancing tests are neither 
perfect, nor equipped to provide bright-line rules.220 They do, 
however, allow for flexibility and ensure adequate protection for 
continually evolving substantive rights. 
Characterizing federal rules and state laws as either procedural 
or substantive, as Justices Scalia and Stevens do in Shady Grove, does 
not provide much guidance in determining the validity of the federal 
rule.221 On a broad level, a substantive law is one that affects rights, 
remedies, and the outcome of lawsuits, whereas a procedural rule 
enforces the rights and remedies recognized by substantive law. Yet, 
“[t]he line between procedural [rules] and substantive law[s] is 
hazy”222 as “matters of substance and . . . matters of procedure [are] 
difficult to distinguish and the two are not mutually exclusive 
categories.”223 Procedural rules invariably affect the outcome of 
 
 218. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 219. Id. § 2072(b). 
 220. As mentioned above, see supra note 25, courts engage in a balancing of state and 
federal interests when there is no conflict between a federal rule or practice and a state law, and 
the federal rule or practice involves a countervailing federal policy. Many commentators have 
criticized this balancing test because it produces confusing results. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 404–05 (6th ed. 2002) (“[T]here was 
considerable difficulty in applying the [balancing] test . . . stem[ming] from the fact that there is 
no scale . . . to say with assurance in a particular case that the federal interest asserted is more or 
less important than the interest in preserving uniformity of result with the state court.”); Ely, 
supra note 33, at 709 (explaining that “lower courts . . . experienced considerable difficulty in 
applying” the balancing test set forth in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 
U.S. 525 (1958)). 
 221. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (struggling to delineate 
“procedural” from “substantive”); Debra Lyn Bassett, Enabling the Federal Rules, 44 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 7, 9 (2010) (noting that no definitive line exists “between matters of 
substantive law and matters of procedural law”). 
 222. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). 
 223. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 419–21 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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lawsuits, and all procedural rules are arguably bound up in 
substantive rights.224 A state anti-SLAPP special motion, for example, 
can be characterized as either procedural or substantive. 
Procedurally, it provides a quick means of dismissal. Substantively, it 
protects defendants from burdensome litigation and encourages 
public participation in speech and petitioning activities. 
Recognizing this conundrum, many commentators have 
advocated Justice Harlan’s alternative understanding of a substantive 
law.225 Harlan argued that a law was substantive if it affected “primary 
activity” outside the context of litigation226—that is, if it affected the 
way people lived their day-to-day lives.227 This understanding does not 
help much in differentiating substantive laws from procedural rules. 
Arguably, all procedural rules affect “primary activity.” For example, 
a statute of limitations could be characterized as a procedural rule. If 
a plaintiff is severely injured and does not file within the statute of 
limitations, this could affect the plaintiff’s current financial situation 
(if she has to pay for medical expenses) and future income potential 
(if she can no longer work). Not filing the lawsuit thus affects her 
“primary activity.” Similarly, one commentator has pointed out that a 
rule requiring eight-by-fourteen-inch paper for pleadings and 
motions, rather than eight-by-eleven-inch paper, might appear 
procedural on its face.228 Yet, the size of the paper changes 
entitlements and values. The larger paper might be more expensive, 
or less sophisticated litigants might be unaware of the 
unconventional-size requirement such that substantive rights are 
affected.229 
 
 224. See Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code of State Civil 
Procedure: The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 984 (2009) 
(signaling a “[r]ecognition of the power of procedure to advance substantive agendas”). But see 
Ely, supra note 33, at 724 (“We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of 
the line between substance and procedure. But the realization that the terms carry no 
monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all the contexts in which courts have seen fit to 
employ them need not imply that they can have no meaning at all.” (footnote omitted)). 
 225. See, e.g., Darrell N. Braman, Jr. & Mark D. Neumann, The Still Unrepressed Myth of 
Erie, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 403, 442–44 (1989) (advocating Justice Harlan’s view of substantive 
laws). 
 226. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 227. See Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1171 (“Justice Harlan appeared to view rules as 
substantive if they affect the way people live their day-to-day lives and conduct their worldly 
affairs in light of the law . . . .”).  
 228. Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 891–92 (2011). 
 229. Id. 
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Moving beyond the confusing labels of procedural and 
substantive, the REA is better viewed as a balancing of federal and 
state interests. The REA encourages uniform federal procedure in 
granting Congress full “power to prescribe general [federal] rules 
of . . . procedure.”230 It then takes away some of this power and 
refuses to permit federal rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”231 The REA thus tempers the federal interest in 
uniformity with a respect for state regulatory policies. Moreover, 
whereas Justices Scalia and Stevens characterized state laws and 
federal rules as procedural or substantive in Shady Grove, they in fact 
agreed, albeit subtly, that balancing state and federal interests was the 
“proper technique” in assessing the validity of a federal rule.232 
Despite this agreement on balancing state and federal interests 
as the “proper technique,” both Justices Scalia and Stevens failed to 
give meaningful consideration to the state interests.233 Justice Scalia 
looked solely at the federal rules and found them valid if they “really 
regulate[] procedure.”234 This procedural test ignores the REA’s 
limitation that federal rules “not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”235 Justice Stevens adhered more closely to the text 
of the REA and read its two requirements together, such that federal 
rules cannot be “so intertwined with . . . state right[s].”236 He 
purported to focus on state laws and their relationship to state 
“substantive rights or remedies.”237 With hesitation, Justice Stevens 
noted that seemingly procedural rules—such as state laws that make 
it more difficult to bring or prove a claim, or define the amount of 
recovery—might be “bound up with . . . state-created right[s] [and] 
 
 230. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 231. Id. § 2072(b). 
 232. Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1199–1200; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., 
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 424–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting “the 
balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a 
State’s construction of its own rights and remedies”). 
 233. See Bauer, supra note 38, at 955 (criticizing Justice Scalia in Shady Grove for 
“dismiss[ing states’ rulemaking roles] with the back of [his] hand by his singular adoption of a 
federal standard to characterize the state law”); Doernberg, supra note 29, at 1203 (criticizing 
Justice Stevens in Shady Grove and noting that “[a]sking only whether a rule may have a 
substantive effect is not helpful”). 
 234. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U.S. 1, 14 (1941)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 235. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 236. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 237. Id. at 419. 
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remed[ies].”238 Yet, like Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens failed to give 
much meaningful weight to the state interests. 
Several past Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that this 
balance ought to include a greater emphasis on state law. Although 
the Court has not yet invalidated a federal rule that conflicts with a 
state law,239 the Court has suggested several times that certain federal 
rules might violate state substantive rights and thus be invalid.240 In 
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,241 the Court 
considered how dismissals under Rule 41(b)242 foreclose future 
litigation, whereas under California law dismissals do not foreclose 
future litigation.243 The Court held that there was no conflict between 
Rule 41(b) and the California law, but that, if there were a conflict, 
Rule 41(b) “would seem to violate” substantive rights.244 Similarly, in 
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,245 the Court noted that 
reading Rule 23.1246 as imposing a requirement on plaintiffs to seek 
direct relief from a corporation’s directors would violate substantive 
rights.247 The Court has thus expressed some willingness to defer to 
state substantive rights and invalidate federal rules.248 
 
 238. Id. at 420; see also id. at 425 n.9 (“For example, statutes of limitations, although in some 
sense procedural rules, can also be understood as a temporal limitation on legally created rights; 
if this Court were to promulgate a federal limitations period, federal courts would still, in some 
instances, be required to apply state limitations periods.”). 
 239. See id. at 407 (plurality opinion) (noting that upon finding conflict between a federal 
rule and state law, the Supreme Court has “rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule 
that has come before [it]”). 
 240. See Steinman, supra note 33, at 273 (“Supreme Court decisions in the last decade or so 
suggest that the substantive-rights provision may be a more robust check on federal rulemaking 
than it appeared to be for most of the twentieth century.”); see also Bauer, supra note 38, at 985 
(“The values which are reflected in the Erie doctrine, and in particular the importance of 
federalism, will be enhanced if the Court would take seriously, rather than merely pay lip-
service to, the agreed benefits of identifying, and then deferring to, state interests.”). 
 241. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
 242. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 243. Semtek Int’l Inc., 531 U.S. at 502–04. 
 244. Id. at 503–04. 
 245. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
 246. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 
 247. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96–97 (“In our view, the function of the demand doctrine in 
delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and of the directors to control 
corporate litigation clearly is a matter of ‘substance,’ not ‘procedure.’”). 
 248. See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–85 (2001) (suggesting that the no 
opt-out provision in Rule 23(b)(1)(B) would violate substantive state rights). In addition, 
several commentators have argued that federal summary-judgment and pleading standards have 
legal consequences that might violate substantive state rights. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 33, 
at 287–88 (“[A]t least in certain situations, current federal approaches to [motions for summary 
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Moreover, as discussed above, the Court has often narrowly 
interpreted the issue to avoid conflict between the federal rule and 
state law.249 This pushes resolution into the relatively unguided 
approach and typically shows the Court’s inclination toward deferring 
to state interests over federal interests.250 In addition, as states have 
engaged in more litigation reform,251 the Court has arguably paid 
more heed to state substantive rights that intersect with procedural 
mechanisms.252 
Taking this willingness to defer to state substantive rights into 
consideration, courts should give teeth to Justice Stevens’s state-
centric, sufficiently interwoven approach and should fully consider 
the state’s purpose in enacting the law, including an examination of 
the broader context against which the law was enacted. This is not to 
suggest that any law a state passes presumptively affects substantive 
state rights. With such a broad conception, all state laws would 
swallow the federal rules. Rather, it is imperative that there be an 
equitable balance among the interests of the state laws and federal 
rules. Deference to state rulemaking roles and the traditional goals of 
equitable administration should weigh heavily but also balance with 
federal concerns of uniformity. 
In terms of state interests, states enact laws to regulate behavior 
and protect the substantive rights of their citizens. Without the ability 
to legislate, there are few other avenues for states to protect their 
citizens. Emphasizing the importance of state rulemaking in our 
federal system, the Court has cautioned that federal rules should 
 
judgment and pleading standards] impermissibly ‘abridge, enlarge or modify . . . substantive 
right[s]’ created by state law.” (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006))). But see, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary Judgment in 
the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2010) (arguing that it is “difficult to imagine 
that the Supreme Court would invalidate [federal summary judgment standards]”). 
 249. See supra Part IV.A. 
 250. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438–39 (1996) (holding 
that there was no conflict between Rule 59 and a New York law on the standard for reviewing 
excessive jury awards and concluding that the New York law applied). 
 251. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? 
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 693–94 (1993) 
(defining litigation reform as “the means by which aspects of the litigation process, including 
adjudicatory procedure, are altered, marginalized, reduced in importance, bypassed, eliminated 
or changed”). 
 252. See John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure and Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform 
Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 295–300 (2008) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s response to litigation reform in Gasperini). 
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“avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies.”253 In 
addition, the Court has stressed the importance of applying state law 
to avoid inequity in the administration of laws and to discourage 
forum shopping.254 Given the prevalence of removal from state courts 
to federal courts, it is likely that a lawsuit may start out in state court 
and quickly move to federal court.255 If the state court and federal 
court apply different laws, a litigant may obtain a different outcome 
in state court as opposed to in federal court in the same state.256 This is 
unfair to the litigant, and tends to encourage plaintiffs to forum shop 
or file in a jurisdiction more favorable to plaintiffs. Even though 
perhaps there are federal interests in avoiding inequity in the 
administration of laws and discouraging forum shopping,257 the 
resulting disparities are “precisely what obligate federal courts to 
adopt state-court practices.”258 
Although courts should heavily weigh this deference to state 
rulemaking authority and states’ desire for the equitable 
administration of laws, courts should also consider the federal interest 
in creating a uniform system of procedural rules. The FRCP were 
enacted to coordinate procedure in federal courts and automatically 
apply in “all civil actions and proceedings in the [federal] district 
courts.”259 Stemming from this, Justice Scalia stressed the importance 
 
 253. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 593 
(6th ed. 2009) (observing that “the Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has interpret[ed] the 
federal rules to avoid conflict with important state regulatory policies”). 
 254. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 255. See Jill Curray & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File? 
A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 827, 866–70 (2013) 
(analyzing the increase in removal from state to federal courts after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). 
 256. See Lynch, supra note 252, at 327 (“A would-be plaintiff should not be able to frustrate 
a state’s attempts to address its own problems in its own way by moving across a state line to 
create diversity.”); Steinman, supra note 33, at 251–52 (noting that applying different rules in 
federal and state courts “leads to precisely the kind of forum shopping that Erie is supposed to 
forbid—plaintiffs craft lawsuits with an eye toward keeping them in state court, and defendants 
strive mightily to justify removal of such lawsuits to federal court”). 
 257. See generally Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1865 (2013) (arguing that the twin aims of Erie serve federal jurisdictional goals). 
 258. Steinman, supra note 33, at 252 (emphasis omitted); see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stressing the importance of reducing inequality and noting that the 
“outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same . . . as it would be 
if tried in a State court”). 
 259. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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of efficient and predictable federal procedure in Shady Grove.260 
These are important considerations, but the FRCP were not exacted 
as the sole means of procedure. Federal uniformity interests are 
insufficient to justify application in all cases and must give way when 
they impinge upon state substantive rights. As a result, the FRCP—
and federal rules generally—tolerate much interstate variation.261 
Thus, in considering whether a federal rule abridges, enlarges, or 
modifies a state right, courts should abandon the 
procedural/substantive distinction and fully consider the state’s 
purpose in enacting laws. The state’s interests in protecting its 
citizenry and equitably administering laws should weigh heavily, 
especially when state constitutional rights are implicated. The state 
interests should also balance with the desire for a uniform system of 
federal procedure. 
D. Applying the Second Prong: Balancing State and Federal Interests 
Applying this second prong to state anti-SLAPP special motions, 
the state interests in enacting anti-SLAPP laws weigh more heavily 
than the federal interests. State anti-SLAPP laws are much more than 
procedural rules “clothe[d] in the costume of the substantive right of 
immunity.”262 Rather, anti-SLAPP laws and their accompanying 
special motions represent a deliberate choice to protect against 
litigation of meritless claims and to encourage freedom of speech. 
Thus, there are three reasons that special motions should apply in 
federal courts sitting in diversity. 
First, states adopt anti-SLAPP laws to prevent ongoing litigation 
with no end goal. As discussed above, the SLAPP filer is not seeking 
a legal or equitable remedy but intends to silence and harass the 
defendant for speaking out.263 The “David and Goliath power 
 
 260. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 404 (2010) 
(“The dissent’s approach of determining whether state and federal rules conflict based on the 
subjective intentions of the state legislature is an enterprise destined to produce ‘confusion 
worse confounded.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941))). 
 261. See Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied 
Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1227 (2011) (“[T]he 
myriad local rules dealing with topics from the trivial to the vital suggest that the federal court 
system already tolerates a considerable amount of interstate and even intrastate variation.”). 
 262. See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2012) (drawing the opposite 
conclusion). 
 263. See supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text. 
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difference”264 between the parties oftentimes leads to financial 
bullying in which the defendant is forced to devote proportionally 
more resources and time to litigation than the plaintiff.265 Anti-
SLAPP laws work to counteract this, with special motions that allow 
defendants to quickly dispense of meritless SLAPP suits. As the 
Boulter court recognized, “There is no question that the special 
motion . . . operates greatly to a defendant’s benefit.”266 Even if anti-
SLAPP laws relieve some defendants of liability for which they are 
truly culpable,267 in enacting anti-SLAPP laws, state legislatures have 
prioritized the prevention of unnecessary financial cost, as well as the 
immeasurable loss to a defendant’s reputation and the psychological 
trauma of navigating the judicial system.268 As the Council of the 
District of Columbia Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary 
reported, anti-SLAPP laws are intended to “incorporat[e] substantive 
rights that allow a defendant to more expeditiously, and more 
equitably, dispense of a SLAPP.”269 
Second, states adopt anti-SLAPP special motions to encourage 
protected speech. The rights to free speech and petition, including the 
ability to engage in public debate and participate in government, are 
fundamental to preserving individual liberty and democracy.270 On a 
national level, these rights are safeguarded in the First Amendment. 
Americans expect that when someone speaks out and expresses an 
unpopular or controversial opinion, there is a “national commitment” 
that this speech “should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”271 
 
 264. Stuborn Ltd. P’ship. v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 265. See supra notes 47–50, 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 266. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d. at 102. 
 267. See Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment 
Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 633 (1998) (arguing that 
it is “illogical and inequitable to grant one right to [one party at] the exclusion of another 
[party]”). 
 268. See generally MICHELANGELO DELFINO & MARY E. DAY, BE CAREFUL WHO YOU 
SLAPP (2002) (describing the psychological impact of a SLAPP suit on two self-employed 
research scientists). 
 269. See Memorandum from Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of the D.C. Comm. on 
Public Safety and the Judiciary, to Councilmembers, Council of D.C., supra note 91, at 2 
(emphasis added). 
 270. See Barylak, supra note 57, at 845 (stressing public participation as essential to 
safeguarding liberty and “resolv[ing] . . . broad social problems”). 
 271. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also FIONA J.L. 
DONSON, LEGAL INTIMIDATION: A SLAPP IN THE FACE OF DEMOCRACY 1 (2000) (“The right 
to free expression suggests that those who challenge both government and corporate policies 
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This protected speech is undermined and public participation is 
thwarted when wealth dominates access to government and the 
ability to question and criticize is silenced.272 Most state constitutions 
derive from the First Amendment similar rights to free speech and 
petition. For example, the Maine Constitution sets forth that “[t]he 
people have a right . . . to request, of either department of the 
government by petition or remonstrance, redress of their wrongs or 
grievances.”273 SLAPP suits, in which the wealthy seek to quell this 
protected speech, thus run contrary to the core rights embodied in the 
First Amendment and many state constitutions. 
This second goal distinguishes anti-SLAPP special motions from 
the New York law addressing class certification in Shady Grove. 
Whereas the New York law in Shady Grove involved the efficiency of 
litigation,274 special motions involve not only efficiency but also the 
constitutional rights to free speech and petition. As such, the state has 
an even more compelling rationale for enacting anti-SLAPP special 
motions. More so than in Shady Grove, disregarding these state 
interests “encroaches dangerously on state sovereignty.”275 As the 
First Circuit conjectured in Godin, such disregard raises “a serious 
question . . . under the [REA].”276 
Third, applying anti-SLAPP special motions in state court but 
not in federal court would lead to an inequitable administration of 
laws and would encourage forum shopping.277 The First Circuit 
expressed this concern in Godin and noted that failing to apply the 
special motion would result in an inequitable administration of justice 
“between [the same] defense[s] asserted in state court and . . . federal 
court” and could lead to forum shopping.278 This concern came to 
 
should have the full protection of the law, so long as they express their opposition in a way that 
does not harm competing interests.”). 
 272. See Braun, supra note 43, at 971–72 (“Institutions such as a free press and a reasonably 
neutral government do not work if people are afraid to use them.”). 
 273. ME. CONST. art. I, § 15.  
 274. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 402 (2010) 
(noting that the New York law was designed to address “whether a class action may be 
maintained”). 
 275. Litwiller, supra note 36, at 95. 
 276. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 90 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 277. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Plainly, if the anti-SLAPP provisions are held not to apply in federal 
court, a litigant interested in bringing meritless SLAPP claims would have a significant incentive 
to shop for a federal forum.”). 
 278. Godin, 629 F.3d at 92. 
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fruition after Boulter. The plaintiffs in Dean v. NBC Universal279 
voluntarily dismissed their case after initially filing in the District of 
Columbia Superior Court.280 The plaintiffs then refiled in federal 
court, with the knowledge that Boulter did not permit anti-SLAPP 
special motions in federal court.281 When special motions apply in one 
court but not in another, states are put in a hard place; the state’s 
ability to effectively legislate and protect against SLAPP suits within 
that state is drastically reduced. 
Overall, states have a strong interest in protecting their citizens 
against SLAPP suits and equitably administering laws. The interest is 
particularly strong when the state law is grounded in state 
constitutional rights. Federal uniformity concerns do not supersede 
these strong state interests. On balance, the compelling state interest 
in protecting citizens and equitably administering laws weighs more 
heavily than federal uniformity concerns. Thus, Rule 12, as applied to 
state anti-SLAPP specials motions, should be invalidated as 
abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive state rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The three opinions in Shady Grove provide significant insight, 
but not much guidance to lower courts in resolving whether state law 
or federal law applies in federal courts sitting in diversity. As a result, 
the First Circuit in Godin and the District Court for the District of 
Columbia in Boulter employed different approaches and came to 
different conclusions. In Godin, the Maine anti-SLAPP special 
motion applied in federal court whereas in Boulter, the District of 
Columbia special motion did not apply in federal court. 
Drawing on the diverging approaches in Shady Grove, this Note 
has attempted to clarify this confusion and advocate a more nuanced, 
two-pronged interpretation for determining the applicability of state 
laws in federal courts sitting in diversity. Under this interpretation, 
anti-SLAPP special motions—not Rule 12—should apply in federal 
courts. Special motions, like Rule 12, permit expedited review of the 
legal validity of a plaintiff’s claim. There is invariable textual conflict 
 
 279. Dean v. NBC Universal, No. 1:12-cv-00283 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 21, 2012). 
 280. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Dean v. NBC Universal, No. 
1:12-cv-00283 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 15, 2012) (requesting voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice because “[t]he Complaint has been re-filed in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia due to the Court’s recent decision in 3M v. Boulter”).  
 281. See id. 
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between Rule 12 and the special motions. Moreover, the special 
motions implicate substantive state rights. State legislatures, in 
enacting special motions, have granted heightened protection to 
defendants and consciously prioritized the defendant’s right to free 
speech over the plaintiff’s right of access to the judicial system. 
Although only time will tell how the Supreme Court will 
interpret Shady Grove going forward, or how state legislatures might 
change anti-SLAPP laws, one hopes that two nearly identical state 
laws implicating substantive rights would apply with equal force in the 
federal courts of both states. 
